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Abstract 
Local conservation efforts are often related to benefits at higher governmental levels. On 
the one hand, these efforts are strongly connected to local land-use decisions. On the other 
hand, activities such as sustainable water management or biodiversity conservation are asso-
ciated with regional, national or even global public goods. Therefore spatial externalities or 
spillovers exist that – if not adequately compensated – lead to an underprovision of the public 
goods and services concerned. This article investigates intergovernmental fiscal transfers as 
an innovative instrument to compensate local jurisdictions for the ecological goods and ser-
vices they provide across local boundaries. From a public finance perspective, fiscal transfers 
are a suitable instrument to internalise spatial externalities. However, most federal states pre-
dominantly use this feature for social and economic public functions rather than ecological 
public functions. This article investigates the case of the “ICMS-E” that has first been intro-
duced by a few states in Brazil during the 1990s. Part of the revenue of this value-added tax is 
redistributed to the local level based on ecological indicators. In this way, the state level uses 
fiscal transfers to compensate municipalities for the existence of protected areas and other 
ecological services provided within their territory. The Brazilian experience illustrates that 
such fiscal transfers can represent both a compensation for land-use restrictions to be born and 
an incentive to appreciate and engage in more conservation activities at the local level.   2 
Introduction 
Sustainable land use requires a variety of conservation efforts and services, not least at the 
local level. Dealing with environmental pollution is as necessary as focusing on precautionary 
tasks such as soil, water and biodiversity conservation. The environmental quality of a land-
scape is closely linked to its land-use pattern and the type of management performed by pub-
lic jurisdictions and private land users. However, there are few incentives for local actors to 
encourage in conservation activities when ecological benefits cross local boundaries (Perrings 
& Gadgil 2003). This is the case for a number of ecological services, for example water pro-
tection or nature reserves. Decisions on the designation of the respective protected areas are 
often taken by institutions above the local level, whereas the concrete consequences in terms 
of restrictions in land use are to be born by local actors, often without any or sufficient com-
pensation.  
The aim of this contribution is to present innovative instruments that are able to address 
this basic problem. We will analyse the role intergovernmental fiscal transfers can play in 
federal systems for compensating local ecological services. From a public finances perspec-
tive, it is the “value-added” of local ecological services, i.e. the benefits crossing the bounda-
ries of local jurisdictions which are of special interest. Therefore, the first part of this chapter 
gives a short introduction into public finances principles as relevant to ecological goods and 
services (Ring 2002). The second part presents a case study from Brazil, focusing on the 
status quo and the incentive effects of integrating ecological public functions into intergov-
ernmental fiscal transfers. Since the 1990s, several states in Brazil have introduced fiscal 
transfers that explicitly compensate municipalities for certain ecological services, such as wa-
tershed protection and conservation areas (Bernardes 1999; Grieg-Gran 2000; May et al. 
2002). The positive experiences with introducing ecological indicators into the Brazilian sys-
tem of intergovernmental fiscal transfers make it worth to present it as an innovative example 
for potential transfer to other federal systems. 
Compensating the value-added of local ecological services  
Principles of fiscal federalism 
The basic task of fiscal federalism is one of effectively and efficiently assigning public 
functions, expenditures and revenues to the central, state, and local governmental levels in   3
federal systems, or, in other words, determining the optimal size of jurisdiction for the various 
public functions concerned. As Oates (1999, p. 1120) puts it, “... we need to understand which 
functions and instruments are best centralised and which are best placed in the sphere of de-
centralised levels of government”. Concerning the allocation function of the public sectors, 
the basic principle of fiscal decentralisation has been put forward (Musgrave 1959; Oates 
1972). The provision of most public goods and services is more efficiently guaranteed when 
production and consumption are limited to the lowest governmental level possible. In this 
way, the regionally differing preferences of the population can be more adequately reflected 
(Tiebout 1956).  
The general decentralisation rule for allocating public goods and services to lower gov-
ernmental levels only applies in the absence of economies of scale. If economies of scale ex-
ist, the provision of public goods and services concerned should be moved to the cost-
efficient centralised level (Postlep & Döring 1996). In addition, due to the characteristics of 
non-rivalry and non-excludability of many public goods, some of them are associated with 
spatial externalities or spillovers between jurisdictions. Here, the principle of fiscal equiva-
lence comes into play which advocates achieving a “match between those who receive the 
benefits of a collective good and those who pay for it” (Olson 1969, p. 463). Social welfare is 
increased through the differentiation of public services in accordance with local costs and 
preferences. The implementation of fiscal equivalence may require the shifting of competence 
to a more centralised level of government. However, regional cooperation, e.g., in the form of 
negotiations between the parties concerned, can also bring along the potential for an efficient 
Coasian type of resolution of jurisdictional spillovers (Bergmann 1999; Oates 2001). Fur-
thermore, the formation of administrative institutions mapping the spatial range of costs and 
benefits are also discussed to internalise spatial externalities (e.g., Breton 1965; Frey 1996). 
Olson (1969) has suggested still another solution to this kind of problem. Provided disecono-
mies of large-scale operation call for local provision, spillovers can be internalised through 
government grants from more centralised levels. In this way, fiscal transfers in the form of 
grants compensate the local government for the external benefits of its expenditures.  
Intergovernmental fiscal grants play a substantial role in fiscal federalism that can serve 
different functions. The literature emphasises the role of the internalisation of spillover bene-
fits to other jurisdictions. Based on normative considerations of equity, they can also serve the 
purpose of fiscal equalisation among different jurisdictions. These equalising grants play an 
important role in the fiscal system of Germany, as well as in other federal systems such as 
Canada and Australia (Oates 1999). Before moving on to the case studies, we will first intro-  4 
duce the field of environmental federalism and discuss how the principles of fiscal federalism 
generally apply to ecological goods and services.  
Environmental federalism and the role of fiscal transfers 
Environmental federalism links environmental issues with the basic theory of fiscal feder-
alism. Both the general principle of sustainable development as adopted by international con-
ventions and the numerous public ecological functions as already assigned to the various gov-
ernmental levels within nation states call for consideration of ecological goods and services in 
intergovernmental fiscal relations (Ring 2002). On the one hand, ecological public functions 
consist in the conservation and sustainable use of resources and landscapes. These precau-
tionary type functions comprise fields such as soil, water and biodiversity conservation. How-
ever, they also include activities aiming at the conservation of nature as a sound living basis 
for humans, including recreational aims. On the other hand, ecological public functions in-
clude discharging activities such as sewage and waste disposal or the rehabilitation of con-
taminated sites and landscapes, in short dealing with all aspects of environmental pollution. 
The implementation of the concept of sustainable development requires the consideration and 
adequate financing of these ecological public functions at appropriate governmental levels. 
What are the consequences of the decentralisation rule and the principle of fiscal equiva-
lence for environmental issues? Following the general decentralisation rule for the allocation 
function of public services, the provision of ecological goods and services should be assigned 
to lower levels of government where appropriate. However, due to the characteristics of natu-
ral resources and environmental quality, the implementation of this rule calls for a differenti-
ated approach. This is reflected in the on-going discussion on the responsibilities of the na-
tional or even supranational governmental level versus the state or local level in setting envi-
ronmental standards, or carrying out other environmental functions (Döring 1997; Scheberle 
1997; Oates 1999, 2001). 
In the European Union for example, fiscal decentralisation is connected to the term “sub-
sidiarity”. According to the subsidiarity principle as consolidated and adopted by the Treaty 
of Maastricht on European Union of 1992, public policy and its implementation should be 
allocated to the smallest jurisdiction with the competence to achieve the objectives. Since the 
Maastricht Treaty, environmental federalism has been rediscovered and widely debated (e.g. 
Huckestein 1993; Hansjürgens 1996; Döring 1997; Oates 1998). Despite the fundamental 
strengthening of the subsidiarity principle in the new Article 3b of the Treaty, a fair amount of   5
leeway is left for interpretation. Any concrete implementation of environmental policy has to 
consider the specific details of the subject matter.  
For example, the basic research function, the dissemination of information on environ-
mental damages and pollution control techniques or the effectiveness of various environ-
mental policy instruments need to be assigned to a more centralised level of government, for 
this kind of public good tends to be under-provided at decentralised levels (Oates 2001). Fur-
ther issues pointing to a fundamental role of centralised governments relate to global change 
problems such as climate change. Highly mobile environmental compartments and associated 
pollutants that easily cross national boundaries create far-reaching spatial externalities. The 
depletion of the ozone layer, the emissions of carbon dioxide and other air pollutants associ-
ated with climate change require more centralised if not global emission policies. 
In contrast, environmental policy associated with less mobile environmental compartments 
is better suited for assignment to decentralised levels of government (Ring 2002). This is due 
to the lower probability of causing spatial externalities. Problems of land use and soil conser-
vation, as well as public functions associated with inland waters, can usually be solved within 
national boundaries.  
Considering spatial externalities 
Despite the general suitability of land-use questions to be assigned to lower governmental 
levels, spatial externalities may require appropriate solutions. This is especially the case for 
priority areas, e.g. for the protection of natural resources, that may cause costs within the con-
cerned jurisdiction, but externally also benefit others. In contrast to certain local costs, be it in 
terms of land-use restrictions or measures for keeping up and improving the quality of the 
respective reserves, benefits from some of these activities cross local boundaries. 
For example, water protection zones are often located in rural areas, mostly providing 
drinking water far beyond local demand. Especially urban agglomerations and capital regions 
with high population densities and industrial activities heavily rely on water resources lying 
outside own municipal borders. In the case of water resources, an important task consists in 
properly valuing these resources and their functions which then, as far as possible, should be 
reflected in water prices (Hansjürgens & Messner 2002). However, for various reasons this 
option is not yet fully implemented, and, concerning certain tasks of long-term resource pro-
tection might even not be a feasible solution.   6 
The conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity is another example for the widespread 
existence of spatial externalities (Ring 2004). On the one hand, the loss of biodiversity be-
longs to the very serious global change problems, demanding centralised standard setting and 
policies. This is reflected in the Convention on Biological Diversity and related activities. On 
the other hand, decentralised activities related to local land use have – if accumulated – a tre-
mendous influence on the state of biodiversity worldwide. Reflecting the value of ecological 
services in market prices is even more difficult if not impossible for many fields of biodiver-
sity conservation. This is especially true for benefits related to non-use values such as exis-
tence and option values that may accrue to people everywhere. The practical consequences of 
spatial externalities related to species protection are illustrated by an empirical study of List et 
al. (2002). They found in their study of federal and state spending under the Endangered Spe-
cies Act in the U.S. a free-riding behaviour on the part of the states. States tend to spend less 
(relative to the federal government) on those species that demand a large habitat area and 
those whose preservation causes conflicts with economic development. Perrings and Gadgil 
(2003) address a number of reforms necessary to reconcile both local and global public bene-
fits of biodiversity conservation. One of them is adjusting incentives to allow local communi-
ties to be rewarded and paid for their conservation efforts (Unnerstall 2004). 
In the following case study, the focus for solving such discrepancies will be on fiscal trans-
fers. Provided diseconomies of large-scale operation call for local provision, which is usually 
the case for public goods and services associated with land use, spillovers can be internalised 
through government grants from more centralised levels. These grants compensate the local 
government for the external benefits of its expenditures or restrictions to be born. This is es-
pecially necessary for social benefits accruing in the long term where public and private ac-
tors are coming up for today’s costs. In this way, the “value-added” of local ecological goods 
and services is socially acknowledged which at the same time can provide an incentive for 
local actors to engage in more conservation activities.  
Fiscal transfers for local ecological services in Brazil 
Brazil is a federal state with 27 states. Each state has an elected government with revenue-
raising powers. The tax called ICMS (Imposto sobre Circulação de Mercadorias e Serviços) 
represents the largest source of state revenues in Brazil with approximately 90% of overall 
state tax revenues (Loureiro & Moura 1996). It also constitutes an important source of reve-
nue for local governments. The ICMS is a tax on goods and services, similar to the value-  7
added taxes in other countries. It is collected on commercial transactions and exchanges of 
goods and services, such as energy, transportation and communication (May et al. 2002). The 
Federal Constitution of Brazil as of 1988 decrees that 25% of the revenues raised by this tax 
have to be allocated by the state to the local level of government. The Federal Constitution 
further stipulates that 75% of the total amount passed on to the municipalities should be dis-
tributed according to the value added generated by each municipality, the latter being repre-
sented by an index of municipal economic output. The state governments determine the indi-
cators for the allocation of the remaining 25%. Typical indicators used to be based on popula-
tion, geographical area and primary production (Grieg-Gran 2000). It is through the authority 
of the states to define these additional indicators that ecological indicators were introduced in 
the 1990s as part of the State Constitutions of several Brazilian states. Paraná was the first 
state to introduce the ICMS-E (ICMS-Ecológico; that means ICMS with allocation of reve-
nues based on environmental indicators)
1. In 1990 and 1991, the relevant laws and imple-
menting regulations were adopted that allowed for the consideration of ecological indicators 
in the ICMS (Bernardes, 1999). Following Paraná’s experience that actually started using 
ecological indicators in 1992, the states of Minas Gerais (1996), São Paulo (1996), Rondônia 
(1997), Mato Grosso do Sul (2002), Tocantins and Pernambuco (2003) started operating a 
similar system a few years later (Grieg-Gran 2000; May et al. 2002; Villar Martins 2003; 
CPRH 2003; Loureiro 2004). The state of Rio Grande do Sul passed an ICMS-E Law in 1993, 
followed by implementing laws and regulations in 1997 and the final adoption in 1999 
(Freitas 1999). ICMS-E legislation also exists in the states of Amapá (1996) and Mato Grosso 
(2001) (Loureiro 2004). Concerning initiatives in other Brazilian states, Santa Catarina, 
Espírito Santo and Goiás drafted an ICMS-E legislation, Bahia and Ceará submitted ICMS-E 
legislation to their respective state legislatures. In the states of Rio de Janeiro, Pará and 
Amazônia, the ICMS-E has been under serious discussion (Bernardes 1999; Freitas 1999; 
Loureiro 2001; MMA 2002).  
                                                 
1 The ICMS-E is usually known under the term “ecological value-added tax”. This holds both for scientific lit-
erature and common language use in Brazil.  From a public finance perspective, however, this term is mislead-
ing. An ecological tax would be a tax of which the assessment basis is related to ecological indicators. The 
ICMS-E, in contrast, uses ecological indicators for the allocation of its revenues. Therefore, economically speak-
ing, the term ecological grants or ecological fiscal transfers is more appropriate and will be further used in this 
article.   8 
Paraná: Valuing watershed protection areas and conservation units  
Following the implementation of more strict environmental legislation in the early 1980’s, 
a number of municipalities in Paraná which had protected areas in their territories exerted 
pressure on the state legislature and government agencies (Loureiro & Moura 1996). The 
land-use restrictions connected to large conservation and watershed protection areas were 
preventing the municipalities from developing productive activities and thereby generating 
value added. The municipality of Piraquara is a typical example of this situation: 90% of mu-
nicipal territory protects a major watershed for the Curitiba metropolitan region (1.5 million 
inhabitants), and the remaining 10% occupy protected areas (May et al. 2002).  
In response to these concerns, the ICMS-E was introduced as an instrument to compensate 
municipalities with large protected areas for the land-use restrictions they faced, while provid-
ing incentives for conservation. In the case of Paraná, state decision-makers considered the 
long-term costs of water treatment needed due to uncontrolled development around water 
sources. They also were worried about the serious deterioration of the state’s land cover with 
respect to biodiversity protection (Loureiro, cited in Echavarría 2000). Following the approval 
of the Ecological ICMS Law in 1991, from 1992 on, 5% of the total amount distributed to the 
local level is based on ecological indicators. Half of it (2.5 %) is distributed to municipalities 
with watershed protection areas in their territories that partly or completely provide services 
for public drinking water systems of neighbouring municipalities (Loureiro in Echavarría 
2000). The other half is for those municipalities with “conservation units”. Conservation units 
(CUs) are conservation areas including totally protected and restricted sustainable use areas 
that can be publicly managed (federal, state or municipal level), privately owned or managed 
by public-private partnerships. The ICMS-E revenue accrues to the municipality and not to 
the owner of the land. Therefore, the incentive effect primarily addresses local public authori-
ties. However, as we will see later, there is also an incentive effect to encourage public-
private partnerships in terms of more environmentally sound land uses. The protected areas 
can be indirectly (biological reserves, ecological stations and parks) or directly used (indige-
nous areas, extractive reserves and sustainably managed forests). In any case, they have to be 
registered and legally defined for being considered (Grieg-Gran, 2000). In Paraná, the ICMS-
E programme is administered by the Paraná State Environmental Institute (Instituto Ambiental 
do Paraná, IAP).   9
Synopsis of existing approaches 
The states of Paraná, Minas Gerais, Rondônia and São Paulo now operate the ICMS-E for 
several years. Mato Grosso do Sul, Pernambuco and Tocantins just recently introduced the 
new system. For each state is autonomous to decide upon the indicators for distributing 25% 
of the ICMS to the local level, different operating systems are in place. This is important to 
know when comparing various effects among the states. The indicator “conservation units” 
has been introduced by all states with ICMS-E legislation. Although the states use slightly 
different methods to calculate the ecological index of a municipality, the basic procedure is 
the following:  
The revenues allocated are based on the ecological index EIi of municipality i multiplied 
by the total amount of ICMS-E revenues dedicated to conservation units. The ecological in-
dex EIi is calculated by dividing the municipal conservation factor MCFi by the state conser-






i =  (1) 
EIi    Ecological index of municipality i 
MCFi Municipal  conservation  factor of municipality i 
SCF  State conservation factor 
z    Total number of municipalities in the state 
The municipal conservation factor MCFi is based on the total area set aside for protection 





MCF =  (2) 
Area CUi  Total area of conservation units in municipality i 
Area Mi  Total area of municipality i 
The CUs of a municipality are calculated according to equation (3) where the protected ar-
eas are weighted according to the different categories of management. Table 1 shows the con-
servation weights CWn for different types of protected areas in Paraná.    10 
Table 1. Conservation weights CWn for different management categories n of protected areas 
in Paraná. 
Management category  Conservation weight 
Ecological research station  1.0 
Biological reserve  1.0 
Park 0.9 
Private natural heritage reserve  0.8 
National, state or municipal forest  0.7 
Indigenous area  0.5 
Environmental protection area I  0.1 
Area of relevant ecological interest  0.1 
Special, local areas of tourist interests  0.1 
Buffer zones  0.1 
Source: adapted from Grieg-Gran 2000. 
If n denotes the different categories of management, 
∑ × =
n
n n i CW area protected CU Area  (3) 
CWn  Conservation weight for management category n  
The state conservation factor SCF is given by the sum of all municipal conservation factors 









Paraná is currently the only state that is evaluating the quality of protected areas and in-
cluding this into the calculation of the ecological index (Grieg-Gran 2000; May et al. 2002). 
The additional quality index of each protected area is assessed by regional officers of the state 
environmental agency based on variables such as the physical quality; biological quality 
(fauna and flora); quality of water resources (within the CU and in its surroundings); physical   11
representativeness; quality of planning, implementation and maintenance
2. Minas Gerais also 
intends to consider a quality factor. However, the quality evaluation system has not yet been 
developed far enough, and the quality factor is still set at 1.0 for all protected areas.  
Table 2 illustrates the types and shares of all ecological indicators adopted so far for 
ICMS-E allocation by the respective states. Concerning the indicator of waste management in 
Minas Gerais, funds are allocated to those municipalities which show operating solid and liq-
uid waste management systems, duly licensed by the State Environmental Policy Council 
(Bernardes 1999). 
Differences are to be noticed in the way the states introduced ecological indicators into the 
ICMS allocation system. In Rondônia, allocation of ICMS based on value added (75%), popu-
lation (0.5%), area (0.5%) and agricultural production (5%) did not change (Freitas 1999). It 
was the “equal share” indicator being reduced from 19 to 14% to allow for the introduction of 
the ecological indicator with a share of 5% (Grieg-Gran 2000). 
Table 2. ICMS allocation for ecological indicators in the states operating the ICMS-E. 
State  Ecological share  
of total ICMS [%] 
Allocation to resp. 
indicators [%]  
Ecological indicators 
Paraná  5  2.5  Watershed protection areas 
   2.5  Conservation  units 
Minas Gerais  1  0.5  Conservation units 
    0.5  Solid waste disposal and sanita-
tion systems 
Rondônia 5  5  Conservation  units 
São Paulo  0.5  0.5  Conservation units 
Mato Grosso do Sul  5  5  Conservation units 
Pernambuco 1  1  Conservation  units 
Tocantins
3 13  3.5  Conservation  units 
    3.5  Solid waste disposal and sanita-
tion systems; water protection 
    2  Slashing and burning control 
    2  Local environmental policy 
   2  Soil  protection 
Sources: Bernardes 1999; Grieg-Gran 2000; Villar Martins 2003; CPRH 2003; SEPLAN 2003. 
 
                                                 
2 A more detailed description is provided by May et al. (2002, p. 195). 
3 Final implementation state in 2007.   12 
Whereas Rondônia changed its allocation system within one year (between 1996 and 
1997), Minas Gerais introduced its new allocation system step-wise, starting to apply new 
indicators in 1996 with full operation of the new system in 1998. In Minas Gerais, the intro-
duction of the ICMS-E was part of a substantial change of the whole ICMS allocation system, 
popularly known as the “Robin Hood Law” (Bernardes 1999). The allocation based on value 
added was gradually reduced from about 94% (1995) to 80% (1998) to allow for the consid-
eration of other indicators. Apart from the introduction of ecological indicators, eight further 
indicators were implemented: geographical area (1%), population (2.71%), 50 municipalities 
with highest population (2%), education (2%), area cultivated (1%), cultural heritage (1%), 
health expenditure (2%) and own revenue generation (2%). Here, the reform of the ICMS 
system did not only cover ecological aspects, it also included resources redistribution for so-
cial reasons, aiming at making poorer municipalities better off. For this reason, it is a lot more 
difficult to clearly illustrate the effects of the introduction of ecological indicators in Minas 
Gerais compared to Rondônia (Grieg-Gran 2000).  
The state of Tocantins also decided to introduce the ICMS-E in a gradual manner. Having 
started in 2003 with an overall percentage of 3.5% for ecological indicators, Tocantins will 
allocate a total of 13% in 2007 for conservation units and indigenous areas, local environ-
mental policy, slashing and burning control, water and soil protection as well as waste and 
sewage disposal (SEPLAN 2003). 
Before investigating the specific effects of the ICMS-E, a short overview is presented re-
garding the existence and respective categories of protected areas for the states of Paraná, 
Rondônia and Minas Gerais. Table 3 shows the jurisdiction of protected areas in these states 
in 1997, differentiating according to federal, state, and municipal level of jurisdiction. All 
states have in common a very low percentage of protected areas under municipal jurisdiction. 
In Paraná, more than 95%, in Minas Gerais and Rondônia even more than 99% are protected 
under jurisdiction higher than municipal level.  
Rondônia represents a very special situation. This state has an extraordinary high percent-
age of 36% protected areas with more than 50% of all of its municipalities holding protected 
areas (total number of municipalities: 52 in 1998). In contrary, Minas Gerais possesses 2% 
protected area with only about 16% of its municipalities including protected areas as part of 
their municipal area (total number of municipalities: 853 in 1998) (Grieg-Gran 2000). Paraná 
also has about 2% protected areas (total number of municipalities: 400 in 1999). 
   13
Table 3. Jurisdiction of protected areas in Paraná, Rondônia and Minas Gerais (1997). 
 Federal  State  Municipal  Total 
Paraná      
Area protected [ha]  502,471  1,013,421  69,699  1,585,590 
Percentage of total protected area  32  64  4  100 
Protected areas as % of total state area        2 
Rondônia      
Area protected [ha]  6,637,462  2,406,018  1,150  9,044,630 
Percentage of total protected area  73  27  0.01  100 
Protected areas as % of total state area        36 
Minas Gerais      
Area protected [ha]  830,269  331,078  2,772  1,164,119 
Percentage of total protected area  71  28  0.24  100 
Protected areas as % of total state area        2 
Source: Grieg-Gran 2000, p. 7. 
 
Participation in the programme 
Participation of municipalities in the ICMS-E programme is voluntary. Therefore, an im-
portant prerequisite for the success of the programme is a good information policy. Munici-
palities need to know about the programme and also expect benefits from participation for 
actually making an effort to apply. In Minas Gerais for example, the decentralised structure of 
the State Forest Institute that is responsible for monitoring all information related to ICMS-E 
transfers based on conservation units turned out to be extremely helpful for publicity of the 
new law. With its 150 local and 14 regional offices it acted as an important source of informa-
tion for municipalities with an interest in participation (Bernardes 1999).  
May et al. (2002) indicate that since its inception, Minas Gerais showed a 100% increase in 
the number of municipalities that benefited from ICMS-E revenues. Currently, about 30% of 
all municipalities in Minas Gerais participate in the programme. In Paraná, the ICMS-E Pro-
gramme began with a participation of 112 municipalities and grew to 192 in 1998, with an 
estimated rise to 220 in 1999. Over 50% of all municipalities are participating in the pro-
gramme with an increase of over 45% in the number of municipalities benefiting from ICMS-
E revenues (May et al. 2002).   14 
The ICMS-E has greatly improved relations between protected areas and the surrounding 
inhabitants (Bernardes 1999). Instead of perceiving protected areas as an obstacle to devel-
opment, they are starting to see them as an opportunity to generate revenue. More municipali-
ties are now aware of the existence of protected areas within their territories and are beginning 
to change their attitude towards them. They are more open to create new reserves and, de-
pending on the design of ecological indicators, also care about the quality of these areas. Dur-
ing the first year of operating the ICMS-E in Minas Gerais, only federal and state protected 
areas were considered, protected areas at municipal level were excluded because they lacked 
formal registration. Already the following year brought about the official registration of exist-
ing municipal protected areas and they were included in the ICMS-E programme (Grieg-Gran 
2000).  
Increase in protected areas 
In Rondônia, the introduction of the ICMS-E was too recent to show a significant effect on 
the area and management of land set aside for protection. In Paraná and Minas Gerais, where 
it is now in operation for several years, there is a clear incentive effect in a way that new pro-
tected areas have been created, especially at local and state level. For public protected areas, 
the ICMS-E has become an important stimulus for the creation of new conservation units and 
for improved environmental management and quality of these areas.  
In Paraná, the total area in conservation units grew by over one million hectares in the year 
of 2000, representing an overall increase of 165% during the 9 years since its inception in 
1992 (May et al. 2002). Table 4 shows that municipalities developed a strong interest in des-
ignating new public protected areas at the local level. The introduction of the quality evalua-
tion of conservation units had a positive effect on the interest of municipalities to improve 
their management (Grieg-Gran 2000, p. 21). Some of the municipalities and their mayors also 
started supporting private land users in managing conservation units, including provision of 
staff, equipment and vehicles for managing the areas. 
In Minas Gerais, conservation units grew by slightly over one million hectares in 5 years, 
representing a 62% increase (see Table 5, May et al. 2002). As for public protected areas, the 
designation of new protected areas was exclusively carried out at the state and municipal level 
of government. In Minas Gerais, however, the ICMS-E is not the only reason for the increase 
in protected areas: part of the initial growth is due to the efforts by local governments to regis-
ter existing units that had not been regulated by the state before.    15
Table 4. Public and private protected areas in Paraná before and after the ICMS-E. 








Public       
 Federal  289,582  50,846  340,428  18 
  State  39,859 13,804 53,663  35 
  Municipal  1,429 2,740 4,169  192 
Private/mixed       
 APA  306,693  905,631  1,212,324  295 
  RPPN  0 26,124 26,124  
  Other  0 53,607 53,607  
Total  637,563 1,052,752 1,690,315 165 
Source: May et al. 2002, own calculations. APAs (Environmental Protection Areas) can be designated at federal, 
state or municipal level. RPPNs (Private Natural Patrimony Reserves) can be designated at federal or state level.  
 
Table 5. Public and private protected areas in Minas Gerais before and after the ICMS-E. 








Public       
 Federal  268,147  0  268,147  0 
  State  295,151 196,436 491,587  67 
 Municipal  3,851  9,076  12,927  236 
Private/mixed       
 APA  1,023,566  785,894  1,809,460  77 
  RPPN  20,261 13,808 34,069  68 
Total  1,610,976 1,005,214 2,616,190  62 
Source: May et al. 2002, own calculations. APAs (Environmental Protection Areas) can be designated at federal, 
state or municipal level. RPPNs (Private Natural Patrimony Reserves) can be designated at federal or state level.  
 
In Paraná and Minas Gerais, intra-state allocations favour municipalities with large areas 
dedicated to state or federal indirect use conservation units (May et al. 2002). Parks, reserves 
and forests are highly weighted by allocation criteria. Nevertheless, substantial volume of 
financial resources has been allocated to municipalities with Environmental Protection Areas 
(APAs). APAs alone account for 86% (Paraná) respectively 78% (Minas Gerais) of the in-
cremental increase in total new conservation units in these states, the vast majority being   16 
dedicated to state and municipal APAs. APAs are easily created and a relatively low level of 
control is exerted within them. They may cover large areas within a municipality with re-
stricted zoning, in spite of far less rigorous enforcement than other conservation units, which 
is reflected by rather low weights by allocation criteria.  
Following the introduction of the ICMS-E, new state legislation in Paraná and Minas 
Gerais has enabled the generation of a wider range of conservation units, including areas es-
tablished under municipal jurisdiction as well as the Private Natural Patrimony Reserves 
(RPPN). The private reserves are established and run by their owners. Owners are fully re-
sponsible for their maintenance and management, yet they may indirectly benefit from the 
revenues, municipalities receive based on the ICMS-E. Since the introduction of the ICMS-E, 
RPPNs have increased in number and area: By the year 2000, Paraná created some 26,124 ha, 
Minas Gerais designated 34,069 ha of private reserves. Both states are actively promoting 
RPPNs as part of an integrated public-private partnership in buffer zones surrounding public 
protected areas (Bernardes 1999). The positive experience with these reserves was triggered 
by the ecological fiscal transfers which motivated local governments to assist landowners in 
measures to protect and maintain the environmental quality of their areas, as well as helping 
them to prepare the necessary registration documentation (Bernardes 1999). May et al. (2002) 
mention for Paraná that mostly large farmers were prioritised for RPPN creation due to their 
size of property and the volume of resources to be generated thereby. Although small farmers 
can also be interested in RPPN creation, their lands are not usually eligible due to the small 
size and high transaction costs associated with it.  
Bernardes (1999) presents figures of protected areas in Minas Gerais until June 1999 that 
further break down the categories of Environmental Protection Areas (APA) and Private 
Natural Patrimony Reserves (RPPN) according to their governmental levels (Table 6)
4. These 
figures clearly show how strong an incentive effect the ICMS-E exercised on the initiative at 
state and local levels to create new protection areas. The largest absolute increase 
(552,976 ha) in protected areas until June 1999 was due to new conservation units at state 
level. However, the largest relative increase of 1,619% took place at municipal level, where 
120,294 ha of protected areas existed in June 1999 compared to only 6,997 ha before the in-
troduction of the ICMS-E. 
                                                 
4 Bernardes (1999) and May et al. (2002) slightly differ in their base figure of protected areas in Minas Gerais 
until 1995. Due to the little difference of less than 1% this is not further considered here.   17
Table 6. Protected areas in Minas Gerais before and after the ICMS-E according to govern-
mental levels. 








Federal  909,467 5,710  915,177  0.6 
State  695,610 552,976  1,248,586  79.5 
Municipal  6,997 113,297 120,294  1,619.2 
Total  1,612,074 671,983  2,284,057  41.7 
Source: Bernardes 1999, own calculations. In this table, public and private/mixed protected areas such as APAs 
and RPPNs are already included in the figures presented according to their governmental level of designation.  
 
 
Changing municipal revenues 
The total amounts passed through to municipalities are appreciable. In the state of São 
Paulo, distributions through ICMS-E amounted up to 70,241 million Brazilian Real (R$) be-
tween 1994 and 1996, averaging over R$ 23.4 million annually. It is estimated that participat-
ing municipalities in São Paulo received about R$ 2.45 per month and ha protected area (Ber-
nardes 1999).  
In Paraná, amounts averaged over R$ 50 million annually between 1994 and 2000
5 (May et 
al. 2002). Individual municipalities increased their revenues considerably such as Piraquara in 
Paraná. 90% of the municipal territory protects a major watershed for the Curitiba metropoli-
tan, and the remaining 10% occupy protected areas. This municipality increased its earnings 
by 84% in 1995 (Loureiro, cited in Echavarría 2000). 
May et al. (2002) investigated municipal revenues in the Paraná floodplain, so-called “Var-
jão”. Located in the northwestern part of the state, it lies within the Paraná, Paranapanema and 
Piquiri watersheds. Here, the ICMS-E constitutes a high percentage of overall municipal 
revenues and became a solution to the financial problems of the municipalities. For example, 
impacts of ICMS-E resources are especially significant in the municipality of São Jorge do 
Patrocínio that has 52% of its total area in conservation units (May et al. 2002, p. 185). In 
1998, the ICMS-E transfers represented 17.6% of the overall municipal budget and in 2000, 
the ICMS-E revenue amounted up to 71% of total ICMS transfers for this year. Conservation 
                                                 
5 In June 2001: Brazilian Real R$ 1.00 = US$ 0.41   18 
began to become a important part of the municipal agenda, also of neighbouring municipali-
ties. It led to the creation of Brazil’s first municipal consortium for biodiversity protection in 
1995 and 2 years later of the Ilha Grande National Park. Differences in ICMS-E pass-
throughs are mainly due to the proportion of the Park area in the total area of municipality. 
Local population perceives the financial importance of the ICMS-E for revenue generation, 
and behaviour of the community towards the environment changed. ICMS-E resources are 
nowadays used for numerous environmental activities, such as well drilling to provide drink-
ing water, cleaning and landscaping of the urban area, garbage collection, landfills, environ-
mental education or enforcement of land use controls in parks and APAs. They are also used 
for other activities, such as the acquisition of tractors or the construction of industrial facili-
ties. “All these benefits, provided by ICMS-E revenues, are disclosed to the community to 
make the public aware of the link between environmental protection and day-to-day-
problems.” (May et al. 2002, p.185). 
Grieg-Gran (2000) investigated the detailed financial effects of the ICMS-E for the states 
of Rondônia and Minas Gerais. Due to the relatively low number of municipalities in 
Rondônia, a full picture for the whole state is available. Here, the 5% ecological share of total 
ICMS was introduced between 1996 and 1998 in combination with the equivalent reduction 
in the equal share indicator. As a consequence, municipalities must have at least 25% pro-
tected areas within their territory to outweigh reduction in the equal shares indicator. Munici-
palities with more than 25% protected areas can significantly benefit from the new type of 
grants. The winners of ICMS-E introduction are 7 municipalities with more than 50% pro-
tected areas, 3 municipalities between 40 and 50%, 6 municipalities between 30 and 40% pro-
tected areas, and one municipality between 25 and 30%. To sum up, in Rondônia roughly 
60% of the municipalities with protected areas benefited from the introduction of the ICMS-
E. The other 40% experienced a negative impact due to the reduction in the weight given to 
the equal shares indicator.  
In Minas Gerais, amounts between 1998 and 2000 reached about R$ 15 million annually 
(May et al. 2002). In 1998, 86 municipalities with protected areas benefited from the increase 
in their consolidated index for ICMS allocation due to the ecological indicator (Grieg-Gran 
2000). 38 municipalities with protected areas experienced a reduction in their overall index. 
The reduction in revenues resulted not so much because of little protected area but because of 
other factors. Partly, this was due to the reduction in the weight given to value-added, partly 
this resulted from the introduction of other new indicators such as health and education. In the 
case of Minas Gerais, it is important to separate effects of the ecological indicator from other   19
indicators. For some municipalities, though, the introduction of the ecological indicator turned 
out to be extremely important. In 1998, the ecological index accounted for more than 20% of 
the consolidated index in some 20 municipalities. The municipality of Marliéria, for example, 
has 55% of its territory within the Rio Doce State Park as the largest contiguous area of At-
lantic Forest in Minas Gerais. Here, the ecological index accounts for 70% of the overall in-
dex for ICMS allocation (Grieg-Gran 2000), and in the first year after introducing the ICMS-
E, revenues from it accounted for around 68% of the total municipal ICMS revenues, increas-
ing from R$ 36,648 in 1995 to R$ 811,335 in 1996 (Bernardes, 1999).  
Grieg-Gran (2000) presents calculations for Rondônia and Minas Gerais in order to iden-
tify the potential benefits to be expected for municipalities that set aside further 1,000 ha of 
protected area.
6 Especially for municipalities with very low average levels of value added and 
primary production, the conservation option would turn out to be beneficial. In the case of 
Rondônia, it would be attractive for 28 municipalities to create protected areas. Among these, 
only 12 already have protected areas, 16 are without and could be financially better off with 
protected areas. Comparative calculations for Minas Gerais are more complicated due to 
complex changes in overall ICMS-E allocations. Still, there are municipalities with low levels 
of value added where the creation of protected areas would be extremely financially attrac-
tive. São Sebastião do Rio Preto with no conservation units would have to generate at least 
226 times the average value added per hectare in the municipality for it to be more beneficial 
in terms of ICMS revenues than the creation of 1,000 ha protected area (Grieg-Gran 2000, p. 
24). 
Recommendations based on the Brazilian experience 
Although the basic features of the ICMS-E are rather uniform across the various states, the 
way of implementing it, its operation in practice and the reactions on the side of municipali-
ties can greatly vary. In-depth empirical studies show that ICMS-E allocations appear to have 
substantial impacts on conservation decisions in some areas, while in others only a limited 
impact can be observed (May et al. 2002). Particularly municipalities with a high share of 
protected areas can substantially benefit from the ecological grants, and therefore, appreciate 
the ecological services they provide across local boundaries. Many municipal governments, 
and depending on their information policy, also the public, are now aware of the natural assets 
                                                 
6 Grieg-Gran (2000) assumes that the municipality in concern is the only one in the whole state adding 1,000 ha 
of protected area within its territory.   20 
they preserve and maintain. However, the type of indicator chosen also determines the incen-
tive effect. The example of Paraná shows that not only the quantity, but also the quality of the 
respective areas should be taken into consideration. Here, not only the number and surface 
area of conservation units have increased, there are also noted improvements in the quality of 
conservation units (Loureiro & Moura 1996). The implementation of a quality evaluation 
waits to be implemented for all other states except Paraná, representing a major challenge due 
to the regular controls of the registered areas by decentralised environmental institutions.  
Another critique refers to the way the ICMS-E revenues are currently allocated to munici-
palities. So far, they are given as lump-sum transfers, to be used in any way the recipient 
wishes. Some authors argue that ear-marking for environmental purposes should be consid-
ered (Grieg-Gran 2000; May et al. 2002). However, from a general public finances perspec-
tive there are also a number of arguments in favour of lump-sum transfers, such as guarantee-
ing maximum financial autonomy to local jurisdictions.  
Perspectives for compensating local ecological services 
One way of counteracting the underprovision of local ecological goods and services would 
be to integrate ecological functions into intergovernmental fiscal transfers to the local level. 
Concerning the suitable types of ecological functions, precautionary ecological functions 
must be stressed whose benefits cross local boundaries, such as nature conservation and water 
protection. These ecological services are mostly provided by designating more or less large 
protected areas that play a significant role in sustainable watershed management and biodiver-
sity conservation in the long run. Usually, local governments have little scope for influencing 
decisions made on the designation and maintenance of a large proportion of the area set aside 
for protection. Due to the regional, national or even international importance of these areas, 
municipalities are obliged to accept decisions made at higher levels of government. In this 
way, the local sovereignty in land-use planning and management is restricted in the long term. 
These decisions also affect the ability to develop productive activities and to generate revenue 
in a variety of ways, both for private land users and local governments.  
In this chapter, the focus was on the role of public institutions, i.e., the local government in 
its need to be compensated for the ecological goods and services it provides. The “forced” 
provision of ecological goods and services in terms of protected areas without compensating 
for positive spillovers is neither effective nor efficient. Provided relevant framework regula-
tion exists, concrete decisions on the immobile factor “land” are best to be taken at most de-  21
centralised levels. This is reflected in the decentralisation of land-use planning in many coun-
tries where concrete implementation is mostly assigned to the local level. From an economic 
view, it is rational for local governments not to be interested in or even be against water and 
nature protection areas if associated costs are to be born locally whereas a number of benefits 
cross local boundaries. Apart from intrinsic motivation in local conservation activities that 
shall not be overlooked here, the majority of municipalities will not support the existence of 
protected areas within their territory. Even though protected areas might exist, lack of en-
forcement, control or just information can easily lead to the deterioration of the quality of 
these areas. Therefore, a prerequisite for long-term sustainable land use consists in the inte-
gration of protected areas with positive spillovers into intergovernmental fiscal transfers to the 
local level. This would keep concrete decisions on land use at the most suitable local level. 
The financial acknowledgement of the provision of ecological services across local bounda-
ries would raise local awareness for the cross-boundary significance of these protected areas. 
By way of the internalisation of positive spatial externalities, it brings local interests in line 
with supra-local interests, thereby making incentives for local behaviour consistent and con-
tributing to economic efficiency. 
The Brazilian case showed that various mechanisms already exist for acknowledging eco-
logical goods and services in intergovernmental fiscal transfers. In other federal system, for 
example in Germany, only very few states have implemented ecological aspects in their fiscal 
system (Ring 2002). The special relevance of protected areas has not yet been recognised. 
Therefore, the majority of German municipalities still perceive them as an obstacle to devel-
opment (Bauer et al. 1996, p. 334; Stoll-Kleemann 2001).  
In Brazil, a few states started to compensate municipalities for the existence of protected 
areas within their territory. During the 1990s, ecological indicators were introduced into the 
system of redistributing the value-added tax from the state to the local level. In the mean-
while, the effects are striking, both in terms of increased protected areas and changing reve-
nues. Especially municipalities with a high share of protected areas can considerably benefit 
from the new ecological fiscal transfers, and therefore, appreciate the ecological services they 
provide across local boundaries. However, attention is asked for regarding the choice of indi-
cators allocations are based on. The example of Paraná shows that not only the quantity, but 
also the quality of the respective areas should be taken into consideration.  
Although this chapter presented a national case study, the general message can be trans-
ferred to other federal systems. Köllner et al. (2002), for example, present a case study for 
integrating biodiversity into intergovernmental fiscal transfers for Switzerland. However, the   22 
kinds of recommendations to be made for considering protected areas of supra-local signifi-
cance strongly depend on the type of federal system investigated, the general role and func-
tions of different jurisdictions within these systems, and the specific environmental legislation 
in force.  
Research at the interface of ecological public functions and the economic theory of federal-
ism is still more or less in its infancy. There are relatively few studies that investigate inter-
governmental fiscal relations for their potential to adequately consider ecological aspects in 
terms of public functions and appropriate financing (Ring 2002). Whereas economic and so-
cial public functions have a rather long tradition in intergovernmental fiscal relations of fed-
eral systems, ecological functions have only been considered comparatively recently. Both the 
theoretical analysis of principles of the economic theory of federalism related to spillovers of 
protected areas and the respective empirical investigations of the Brazilian federal system 
have shown that there still is a great need for adequately rewarding ecological services pro-
vided by the local level.  
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